Manchester United’s shock Carabao Cup defeat to League Two side Grimsby Town summed up the difficulties of Ruben Amorim’s early months in charge. Despite heavy investment — nearly £200m spent this summer — his ideas haven’t translated into consistent results.
United finished 15th last season, and while the aim was clear improvement, Amorim’s tactical framework is already being questioned. So, why isn’t his system clicking? Let’s break it down.
Amorim’s Philosophy: Order Over Freedom
At Sporting Lisbon, Amorim’s 5-2-3 system worked wonders. It’s built on positional play: players stick to their zones, wing-backs provide width, midfielders stay central, and rotations are minimal.
The idea is to create overloads — areas where United have more players than the opposition, often in wide zones. In theory, this gives them easier routes into dangerous areas.
But in practice, especially in the Premier League, it has run into problems.
The Grimsby Example: Beaten by Man-to-Man Press
Against Grimsby, United struggled against a man-to-man pressing system. This type of press cancels out numerical overloads — suddenly, United don’t have the extra man. 
The two classic ways to escape man-to-man marking are:
-
Individual dribbling – beat your man and open up space (as Kobbie Mainoo did for United’s goal).
-
Movement and rotations – dragging markers into uncomfortable areas before quick passing combinations.
Here’s the problem: Amorim’s rigid positional approach discourages both. Players rarely roam, and his emphasis on pre-planned passing patterns leaves little room for improvisation.
Predictable Passing Routines
Amorim relies heavily on “up-back-through” patterns:
-
Ball played forward into the striker’s feet,
-
Laid back to midfield,
-
Then released in behind for a runner (usually a wing-back).
It’s structured, quick, and designed to punish defenders stepping out. Bruno Fernandes, often criticised for forcing long passes, is likely just following instructions.
But when opponents set up in a back five and block the wide areas, United’s patterns become predictable. Grimsby angled their press to funnel United wide, leaving central areas vacant — exactly where Amorim’s system rarely looks.
Defensive Issues: Press Too Easy to Bypass
Out of possession, United also operate in a 5-2-3, pressing high before dropping into a compact block. But their press has weaknesses.
-
Opponents can overload United’s front three by building with four players at the back (using a midfielder dropping deep).
-
Wing-backs are often pinned back by wide players, stopping them from joining the press.
-
That leaves United’s two central midfielders — usually Fernandes and Casemiro — badly outnumbered.
Fulham recently exploited this by pushing Ryan Sessegnon high to pin Amad Diallo, while Alex Iwobi drifted centrally. Suddenly, Fulham had a four-v-two in midfield, easily controlling possession.
Why It Worked at Sporting, But Not at United
At Sporting, Amorim’s strict system flourished because his team often had the best players in the league. With higher individual quality, his rigid game model was enough to dominate.
In the Premier League, however, margins are much finer. United can’t rely on having superior talent every week, and Amorim’s unwillingness to adapt leaves his team predictable and vulnerable.
What Next? Adapt or Struggle
Amorim is a coach of strong principles, but United’s struggles suggest he needs to bend his philosophy. His system requires either:
-
Exceptional individual quality (to win duels within the rigid framework), or
-
Tactical flexibility (to adjust against different setups).
Right now, United don’t have enough of either. If Amorim sticks stubbornly to his blueprint without tweaks, results like the Grimsby defeat may become a recurring theme.
